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Optimal Bargaining through Amalgamated Faculty Units
(NCSCBHEP 2016–04–05)
Robin J. Sowards, Ph.D. (rsowards@usw.org), United Steelworkers

Bargaining for Mission
The issue of faculty bargaining unit composition arises primarily because of the (real or perceived)
conTicts of interest between tenure-stream faculty and contingent faculty. Mixed units have a
mixed track record. As Joe Berry often points out, the very best contract language for contingent
faculty is in mixed units, but the very worst contract language for contingent faculty is also in mixed
units. So simply having a mixed unit guarantees nothing, but it does seem potentially to achieve
better results. In thinking about unit composition, then, we should pay attention both to the effects
of unit composition itself and to whatever other factors might be determine those effects.

Community of Interest
We can get some insight into the factor that, in my view, crucially determines whether a mixed unit
bargains effectively for contingent faculty—namely, union democracy—by looking carefully at how
the NLRB conceives of unit composition. Under the Act, the NLRB is empowered to determine what
unit is appropriate for collective bargaining, and it has returned to the question of exactly how to do
so many times. One particularly illuminating passage comes from the 1962 Kalamazoo Paper Box
decision, which had to do with whether a group of truckdrivers should be carved out of an existing
production and maintenance unit and treated as having a distinct community of interest. In working
through how to determine the bargaining unit, the Board observed that it
“must maintain the two-fold objective of insuring to employees their rights to selforganization and freedom of choice in collective bargaining and of fostering industrial
peace and stability through collective bargaining. In determining the appropriate unit,
the Board delineates the grouping of employees within which the freedom of choice
may be given collective expression. At the same time it creates the context within which
the process of collective bargaining must function. Because the scope of the unit is
basic to and permeates the whole of the collective-bargaining relationship, each unit
determination, in order to further effective expression of statutory purposes, must have
direct relevancy to the circumstances within which collective bargaining is to take place.
For, if the unit determination fails to relate to the factual situation with which the parties
must deal, efacient and stable collective bargaining is undermined rather than fostered.”
(Kalamzoo Paper Box 136 NLRB 10 1962)
I’ll return to the question of what exactly would make faculty bargaining “efacient” momentarily, but
arst I’d like to draw our attention to the Board’s emphasis on making unit determination decisions in
a way that preserves workers’ right to (1) self-organization (i.e., free association), (2) individual
freedom of choice, and (3) “collective expression” of that individual freedom.
The concern with the right to “self-organization” suggests that some deference is due to the
workers’ own decision about who they think should be included, which is just to say that there’s a
presumption in favor of the petitioned-for unit and the employer must bear the burden of
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The concern with individual “freedom of choice” seems a little odd since the Board is perfectly
happy compelling a minority into representation and has, if anything, been stridently resistant to
members-only unions that would seem to facilitate individual “freedom of choice” (see Dick’s
Sporting Goods NLRB Case No. 6-CA–24821). So probably the issue they have in mind here is more
the concern that there will be a tyranny of the majority at the bargaining table, where the interests
of a minority within the bargaining unit are not pursued at the table because they conTict with those
of the majority. The variant of this problem that is probably more common in mixed faculty units is
the situation in which a more privileged minority (tenured faculty) advances its interests at the
expense of a less privileged majority (contingent faculty). But it’s essentially the same problem, and
it’s a problem that every majoritarian democratic procedure faces: it is not clear at all why any
individual’s autonomy should be abrogated merely because they are on the losing end of a vote
(see, e.g., Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism).

Amalgamated Faculty Units
One obvious solution to this problem is to give up on majoritarianism, for example by adopting the
view that decisions should be made by consensus. This approach, of course, has the danger that it
can prevent decisions being made at all, as many people discovered during Occupy’s large general
assemblies. The problem is one of scale: reaching consensus with 10 people is often feasible,
whereas reaching consensus with 10,000 is probably impossible. (There’s a long tradition of
interest in problems of scale in political philosophy, going back to Aristotle’s Politics, but the issue
tends to be under-estimated in current political thinking.) So the traditional way to mitigate the
problems of majoritarianism in a union is to delegate tasks to committees, who are charged with
chewing through potential conTicts, reaching consensus, and bringing the resulting proposals
before the larger body for a vote.
Of course that only works if the committees are composed of individuals who embody the various
interests that might conTict over the issues the committee considers. Nothing in the NLRA or the
LMRDA really compels that representativeness. To the extent that the Board can create conditions
approximating consensus decision-making, it does so through choosing bargaining units in which
the interests of individuals are relatively homogeneous.
From that point of view, it seems obvious that tenure-stream faculty and contingent faculty should
be in different units. Indeed, it might even make sense to petition for separate micro-units of tenurestream and contingent faculty for each academic unit (e.g., schools or colleges), invoking Speciality
Healthcare (357 NLRB 83), in order to limit the heterogeneity resulting from the differences
between pure and applied sciences, say, or academic and professional programs. Each unit would
elect its own leadership, and thus be able to advocate directly for its own interests.
But this leaves out the Board’s other concern in the passage I quoted earlier with the “collective
expression” of those individual interests. In general, the framework of the US legal system has real
difaculties with anything collective, difaculties that have all sorts of absurd results ranging from
treating corporations as if they are individual legal persons to treating unions as “bargaining
agents” rather than just the members of the union acting collectively. The law, in other words, is
incapable of imagining interests that would genuinely be collective, rather than individual.
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss11/62
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come together as a union. This consideration pulls us in exactly the opposite direction of the desire
to defend against a tyranny of the majority or minority: if the faculty as a whole has fundamentally
collective interests, then the faculty should all be in a union together. In short, both autonomy and
solidarity are indispensable elements.

To satisfy both horns of this dilemma, I believe that the optimal solution is for the union to organize
as separate units but then to amalgamate into a single local with the same afaliate (or whatever
corresponding structure a particular afaliate’s structure makes possible). Especially if all of the
units organize in parallel, there’s nothing preventing them from deliberating together, bargaining
together, and acting in solidarity. The unity of the faculty would thus be a matter of internal union
structure, and where conTicts existed they could be addressed without any group feeling
disenfranchised since each unit would have their own elected ofacers. The solution, in other words,
is to put joining together in the hands of academic workers themselves, rather than leaving it up to
the Board to fret about potential variations in interests.
Of course, with separate units administrators could insist on bargaining with each unit separately,
seeking to divide and conquer. But a divide and conquer strategy would be ineffectual as long as
the units are all amalgamated in the same local union. The only effect would a dramatic loss in the
“efaciency” of bargaining that the Board expressed concern about in Kalamazoo. Having to rebargain the same issues, and potentially end up with slightly different arrangements from one
academic unit or one group of faculty to the next, obviously creates all sorts of administrative
headaches. And while bargaining with a uniaed faculty would obviously give the faculty more
leverage at the table, the faculty’s leverage at the table also gives administrators of good will
leverage of their own to push their own constituencies to accede to the faculty demands that would
facilitate carrying out the institutional mission. So big, uniaed bargaining would beneat both sides
of the table.
In two words, then, the optimal arrangement involves both decentralized decision-making and
aggregated action and bargaining
bargaining.

Regional Bargaining
Of course this optimal arrangement may not be feasible in particular circumstances, and strategic
decisions are always hemmed in by what the Board in Kalamzoo refers to as the “factual situation
with which the parties must deal,” such as the situations we’ve faced in our faculty organizing
campaigns in Pittsburgh. For example, when we started organizing at Duquesne University we were
conscious of the fact that we’d probably end up in a protracted legal battle, so we chose just to
organize the part-time faculty in the Liberal Arts in order to clear the legal hurdles out of the way
and then to expand across campus. At Point Park University and Robert Morris University the fulltime faculty were already organized, so we chose to organize the faculty who were yet unorganized.
By contrast, at Chatham University we’ve been able to organize all faculty together from the
beginning, and at the University of Pittsburgh the group that approached us included faculty at all
ranks from the very beginning—a happy circumstance since, when we looked into the relevant
public-sector labor laws, it turned out that we were legally obligated to organize all faculty at all
campuses into a single unit, thanks in part to the Pennsylvania Employee Relations Act’s ofacial
policy against unit “fragmentation” (and also thanks to a 1990 PLRB decision specifying an
appropriate unit that was essentially wall to wall except that it excluded faculty in the School of
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hands. Our strategy for overcoming the rather complex array of circumstances in Pittsburgh is to
amalgamate all of these units into one city-wide higher education local across employers. Bringing
faculty together on a metro scale, while maintaining all of the separate units, offers countless
advantages, even beyond the obvious gains in leverage and solidarity. Administrators need not
worry that they will be at a competitive disadvantage in relation to other institutions in the city
because standards can be bargained that encompass the whole city, a crucial consideration when
the marjority of faculty (contingent faculty) are part of a regional labor market. This also opens up
various win-win opportunities, including offering health care for all faculty through a city-wide trust
managed by the union, then using the dramatic increase in scale to negotiate lower health care
costs than any individual employer could manage. Both administrators and faculty ultimately
beneat from such economies of scale.

In the long run, unionists should start talking about how we might form inter-union regional
councils in particular sectors, like higher education, who engage in coordinated bargaining at a
regional level, perhaps facilitated through CLCs. Keeping such arrangements localized has the
potential to Ty under the radar of some kinds of unhelpful inter-union politics, while also cultivating
a movement-oriented ethos that we are going to need if we want to enact the systemic change for
which workers in all sectors are clamoring.
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